Transport Insights

The transport stories you won't see in the industry-friendly media

Author

Chris Ames

Tag: national highways

  • Puttng lipstick on a pig

    Transport Action Network (TAN) has posted another of its National Highways Watch pieces, with significant input from me, and it has been almost simultaneously vindicated by comments in the draft Third Road Investment Strategy (RIS 3).

    The piece Highway robbery – abusing Designated Funds compares National Highways’ use of designated funds, pictorially at least, to putting lipstick on a pig – i.e. prettifying large and potentially environmentally destructive road building schemes with greenwashing.

    TAN has discovered that National Highways is syphoning off money from a dedicated fund for environmental and safety improvements (called ‘Designated Funds’1) to use it as sweeteners or greenwashing for new roadbuilding schemes. National Highways is also raiding the “ringfenced” funding to pay for mitigation that should come out of the scheme budgets.

    The piece highlights a number of alleged misuses of designated funds, including “sweetening the Lower Thames Crossing”:

    A document on “Benefits and Outcomes” submitted as part of the scheme’s planning application mentions “Designated Funds” 25 times, and claims that “Over £30 million of designated funds have been allocated to Lower Thames Crossing”, despite having to make clear that these benefits technically “fall outside of the remit of the DCO [planning application]”.

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  • Don’t look to Labour to fix smart motorways

    The draft of the third Road Investment Strategy (RIS 3) published this week suggests that ministers are happy with a smart motorway network where many places to stop in an emergency are officially too far apart, putting drivers at increased risk.

    In November 2021, the Transport Select Committee recommended that:

    The Department and National Highways should retrofit emergency refuge areas to existing all-lane running motorways to make them a maximum of 1 mile apart, decreasing to every 0.75 miles where physically possible.

    The Department (for Transport – DfT) accepted this recommendation in principle and in January 2022 announced that £390m would be spent by the end of March 2025 to retrofit “more than 150 additional emergency areas”, alongside a pause on the construction of new all lane running smart motorways.

    The waters were muddied when it emerged that National Highways was counting other places to stop towards the spacing standard, but the company did deliver a promised 151 new emergency areas by the end of March under the National Emergency Area Retrofit (NEAR) programme.

    Although this was said to provide “around a 50% increase in places to stop”, neither the DfT nor National Highways ever said how far the programme would go to fill in all the gaps where the spacing was longer than the official standard.

    National Highways has told me that it had  “prioritised locations where emergency areas could make the most difference and bring benefits to drivers as soon as possible” and suggested that it would like to see a continuation of the programme.

    Labour delayed the start of RIS 3 by a year and gave the company an interim settlement for the current year that says nothing about improving safety on smart motorways.

    In a section on Smart Motorways, the draft RIS 3 document claims that “substantial investment continues to improve the safety of the existing network” citing “the recent completion of additional Emergency Refuge Areas on the All Lane Running (ALR) smart motorways under the National Emergency Areas Retrofit (NEAR) programme”, which it acknowledges “was finished in March 2025” – a whole year before the new RIS.

    There is no commitment to continuing the retrofit of what Labour has now returned to calling “Emergency Refuge Areas”, which leaves National Highways with a spacing standard that it is not funded to deliver.

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  • Official: Smart motorway tech not fit for purpose

    Following on from my piece yesterday about the safety commitments – or lack of them – in the draft 3rd Road Investment Strategy, perhaps the most important comment on the issue comes in a section not about safety but “A technology enabled and enabling network”:

    National Highways should not be over-reliant on technology, for example drawing on insights from the use of cameras and stopped vehicle detection when considering driver safety and welfare.

    For me this is a recognition from government that technology such as stopped vehicle detection (SVD) is not up to the job given to it – keeping people safe when vehicles stop on all lane running “smart motorways” that do not have a hard shoulder.

    It can even be read as a repudiation of “smart motorways” themselves, where the word “smart” was used to imply that their key feature was technology, rather than the removal of the hard shoulder, or at least that the former compensated for the latter.

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  • Safety takes a back seat in Labour’s “draft RIS”

    Ministers have let National Highways off the hook over its continued failings on safety, excusing the company’s failure to meet its 2025 casualty reduction target and allowing it to put its 2040 zero harm pledge back by a whole decade.

    The Department for Transport has published what it is calling a Draft Road Investment Strategy 3, running from April 2026 to March 2031, although the document is billed as a “high-level vision” policy paper and has very little detail.

    The document notes that a consultation on previous papers “revealed that respondents placed the highest importance on improving road safety and environmental outcomes” but offers almost nothing to take these issues forward.

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  • Exclusive: ORR knew shelved A1 scheme had been defunded

    I have obtained new documents showing that National Highways’ regulator knew the government had removed funding from a large roadbuilding scheme and was hiding this from the public and Parliament. The regulator then falsely reported that the scheme would go ahead when it got planning permission.

    By doing this, the Office of Road and Rail (ORR) – supposedly an independent watchdog – became complicit in the deception over the shelving of the A1 Morpeth to Ellingham scheme, which has undermined parliamentary oversight of the government-owned company’s operation and development of the strategic road network.

    As has previously been reported, the Department for Transport (DfT) told National Highways in February 2022 that the A1 scheme had been deprioritised and its funding removed following the Spending Review in late 2021.

    Despite this, both National Highways and the ORR published reports and presented them to Parliament claiming that the scheme would enter construction in the 2022-23 financial year.

    I have now obtained correspondence between the DfT and National Highways from February 2022, which was copied to the regulator, showing not only that a cut to the company’s funding included a saving from not progressing the A1 scheme but that a deliberate decision had been taken to keep the public and Parliament in the dark about the scheme being shelved.

    A letter from a senior DfT official to National Highways’ chief financial officer notes that:

    No public announcement was made about the A1 Morpeth to Ellingham [and another redacted scheme]. Plans will be drawn up for communications about the A1 Morpeth to Elllingham, but for the time being it remains a committed scheme recognising that costs will continue to accrue pending a decision.

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  • Exclusive: National Highways more than a third short on safety scheme pledge

    I have further detail of National Highways’ failure to deliver the actions it pledged to carry out under its “enhanced safety plan” for 2024-25, with confirmation that it delivered only 15 of a promised 24 road safety schemes, less than two-thirds.

    To recap, National Highways’ enhanced safety plan, which regulator the Office of Rail and Road’s (ORR) demanded that the government-owned company “transparently” produce to improve its failing safety record, but which both bodies have continued to hide from the public, was said to have included 43 additional actions to be delivered during the year.

    These comprised 24 road safety schemes, eight communications campaigns, and 11 “working with others” actions.

    In March, the ORR revealed that the company had only delivered 22 of the 43 actions, including just five safety schemes. In July it revealed that only 33 were delivered during the year, but did not reveal how many of these were safety schemes.

    The regulator has now disclosed to me under the Freedom of Information Act that National Highways delivered just 15 road safety scheme during the year against the target of 24.

    The vast majority of the other types of action were complete – all eight communications campaigns and 10 out of 11 “working with others” actions, with the remaining action said to be dependant on the Roads Policing Review.

    This means that although National Highways delivered three quarters of the actions, it delivered less than two-thirds of the safety schemes it promised.

    What the regulator has never clarified is how it assessed whether these actions, which were said to be “additional” to what the company had already planned for the year were genuinely additional rather than part of existing plans.

    As I pointed out in July, it does seem to have now dropped this claim.

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  • More fibs about shelved A1 scheme

    The saga/farce of the cancellation of the A1 to Morpeth to Ellingham scheme, secretly shelved by the Tories in 2022, continues with notice that Labour intends to revoke the Development Consent Order that was granted last year before the election.

    According to the Department for Transport (DfT):

    The Secretary of State for Transport proposes to make an order to revoke the A1 in Northumberland: Morpeth to Ellingham Development Consent Order 2024.

    By way of explanation, the DfT says the transport secretary “is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances that make it appropriate to exercise the power to revoke the A1 in Northumberland: Morpeth to Ellingham Development Consent Order 2024 (“the DCO”). Accordingly, the Secretary of State proposes to make an order to revoke the DCO.”

    It’s not really an explanation of course, and New Civil Engineer reports that  Northumberland Council deputy leader Richard Wearmouth said that the move “feels needless and spiteful”.

    But it brings up another question about the secret shelving of the scheme, which National Highways and its regulator the ORR lied about.

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  • National Highways steps up the greenwashing

    There’s another closure of the A3 this weekend as part of National Highways’ seemingly interminable M25 Junction 10 scheme.

    I’ve written a lot about the disruption caused by the works and once again the closure, this time between the junction and Send to the south, has diversions that involve using the M25 and a longer diversion for vehicles and drivers that are not permitted to use the motorway.

    But what’s most egregious about this is the astonishingly blatant greenwashing. According to the BBC:

    A National Highways spokesperson said: “We are restoring heathland and upgrading the junction with the A3 Wisley Interchange to reduce congestion, improve safety and create more reliable journeys.

    “We thank drivers and the local community for their patience and ask anyone travelling during these times to plan their journeys carefully.”

    National Highways is cutting down a lot of trees as part of a road widening scheme that will encourage more traffic and worsen climate change. Some of the land currently covered by trees will indeed be returned to heathland but to present this as the primary reason for the scheme is outrageous.

    And there is of course the usual trick, which rail companies also do during disruption, of transferring responsibility to the public by asking them to plan or check their journeys.

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  • National Highways lied to ORR over shelved A1 scheme

    I have had two responses from the Office of Road and Rail (ORR) to my questions about what it was told about the secret decision in late 2021/early 2022 to shelve the A1 Morpeth to Ellingham scheme and the story gets murkier and shabbier.

    By way of a recap, both National Highways and the ORR falsely told the public and Parliament in July 2022 that construction of the scheme would start in 2022-23.

    The ORR has confirmed that it was given information that should have stopped it making this false claim:

    In February 2022 we were informed that A1 Morpeth to Ellingham was “deprioritised in SR21”.  However, the scheme remained committed under RIS2 until a formal change had been agreed by the Secretary of State for Transport, as legislated under the Infrastructure Act 2015. 

    The National Audit Office (NAO) said in November 2022 not only that the scheme had been deprioritised but that it had had its funding withdrawn in February and still had no funding in nine months later. But the ORR hasn’t yet confirmed – or denied – that it was told this key point.

    I asked it (again) why it said in its annual assessment of National Highways 2021-22 that the scheme would go ahead in 2022-23, which is incompatible with the scheme being “deprioritised”.

    It said:

    Our annual assessment of National Highways’ performance for 2021-22 reported the formally committed position National Highways agreed with government. The project remained in the company’s portfolio, with start of works and open for traffic commitment dates, that we reported were at risk. We also reported that the company still forecast spend against the project.

    The revelation that National Highways did not just keep the deprioritised and defunded scheme in its portfolio but gave it completely false start of works and open for traffic “commitment” dates goes to the heart of this scandal.

    It means that no delivery plan from the company can ever be taken at face value again – and that the ORR, which has had to take action against National Highways for a breach of its licence obligations to supply accurate information – *should* never trust the company again.

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  • DfT confirms funding withdrawn from A1 scheme

    I have a further explanation from the Department for Transport (DfT) on why it doesn’t think that National Highways and the Office or Rail and Road (ORR) misled the public and Parliament when they said the A1 Morpeth to Ellingham scheme would start construction in 2022-23, despite being deprioritised and its funding withdrawn.

    It isn’t really much of an explanation and appears to depend on conflating the suggestion that these bodies should have said the scheme was cancelled (it wasn’t; I didn’t) with what I actually said, which is that they should not have actively pretended it was going ahead within a specific timeframe, when it wasn’t.

    I think the top line is that:

    The claims National Highways and the Office of Rail and Road misled the public are untrue, as the positions they set out were in accordance with the status of ministerial decisions on the projects at the time.

    This depends on pretending that schemes going ahead soon and not (yet) being cancelled is the same thing. In addition: 

    A Spending Review funding allocation is not the same as a project decision; the latter requires specific approval by a Transport Minister. 

    The DfT also says that the scheme remained in the RIS portfolio [which] is reflected in the language used by the National Audit Office (NAO) report in September 2022 and the subsequent National Highways delivery plan.

    It is absolutely true that the scheme remained without funding in the portfolio awaiting a final decision on whether to proceed, as the NAO revealed and as I reported.

    But again, the DfT is trying to pretend that being in the portfolio without funding awaiting a final decision on whether to proceed is compatible with what National Highways said and the ORR also reported, which is that it was going ahead *that year*.

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